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1.1. Outline
Consider an agent who must choose an action today under uncertainty about
the consequence of any chosen action but without having in mind a complete
list of all the contingencies that could inﬂuence outcomes. She conceives of some
relevant (subjective) contingencies or states of the world but she is aware that these
contingencies are coarse - they leave out some details that may aﬀect outcomes.
T h o u g hs h em a yn o tb ea b l et od e s c r i b et h e s eﬁner details, she is aware that they
exist and this may aﬀect her behavior. How does one model such an agent?
The reason for addressing this question seems clear. Outside of artiﬁcial
laboratory-style settings, it would seem impossible for any decision-maker to iden-
tify all relevant and ﬁnely detailed contingencies. A sophisticated agent would be
aware of her limited foresight and admit the possibility that her conceptualiza-
tion of the future is incomplete, and then she would take this into account in her
decision-making. Think, for example, of a portfolio choice setting. An investor
may identify some factors that are likely to inﬂuence returns to ﬁnancial securities.
However, few sophisticated investors would be conﬁdent that they have identiﬁed
all relevant factors. Awareness that her conceptualization is missing some details
would presumably inﬂuence an investor’s choice of portfolio.
The standard Savage approach to modeling uncertainty, using a primitive state
s p a c e ,d o e sn o tc a p t u r et h ea g e n t sw eh a v ei nm i n d .I ti si n a p p r o p r i a t ef o rt w o
reasons. First, each Savage-style state is a complete description of the world - it
determines a unique outcome for any chosen action. Second, even if we knew how
to model a “coarse or incomplete state” and we redeﬁned the Savage state space
accordingly, the resulting approach would still be unsatisfactory if, as in Savage,
the state space were adopted as a primitive and thus presumed observable by the
modeler. Ideally, the agent’s conceptualization of the future should be taken to
be subjective - it should be derived from preference, that is, from in principle
observable behavior.
Kreps [14, 15] was the ﬁrst to raise the modeling problem posed above. He,
and also subsequent authors, refer to “unforeseen contingencies”, but it seems that
they have in mind what we prefer to call “coarse contingencies.” Kreps’ seminal
idea was that demand for ﬂexibility is indicative of an individual’s awareness
of the coarseness of her conception. In order to capture demand for ﬂexibility,
his model postulates preference over menus. Nehring [21] and Dekel, Lipman
and Rustichini [4] provide alternative extensions. In the models of Kreps and
2Nehring, menus consist of alternatives from an abstract (typically ﬁnite) set. We
focus primarily on the model of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (henceforth DLR),
where menus consist of lotteries over alternatives. The richer domain permits,
given suitable assumptions, the derivation of a (unique) subjective state space
as part of the representation of preference. But are these states coarse? DLR
describe (p. 893) the agent they view themselves as modeling: “... she sees some
relevant considerations, but knows ther em a yb eo t h e r st h a ts h ec a n n o ts p e c i f y .
For simplicity, we assume henceforth that the agent conceives of only one situation,
‘something happens,’ but knows that her conceptualization is incomplete.” Later
(pp. 919-20), they describe what is needed for a critique of their model: “... just
as Ellsberg identiﬁed the role of the sure-thing-principle in precluding uncertainty-
averse behavior, we believe that one must ﬁrst ﬁnd a concrete example of behavior
that is a sensible response to unforeseen contingencies but that is precluded by
our axioms. An important direction for further research is to see if there is such
an Ellsbergian example for this setting and, if so, to explore relaxations of our
axioms.” This is the direction we pursue here.
Our central argument is that an agent who is aware of, and averse to, the
coarseness of her conceptualization of the future will have an incentive to ran-
domize, and thus will violate Independence. As an example, suppose that her
subjective conceptualization is trivial - “something happens”. Suppose further
that she is indiﬀerent between committing ex ante to lottery β or to lottery β
0.
She is aware ex ante that there are unforeseen (ﬁner, or back-of-the-mind) con-
tingencies that could aﬀect the desirability of any action. Though she does not
understand these ﬁner details and is not able to describe them, she is nevertheless
aware that they exist, and she may feel that some may make β
0 more desirable
ex post and some may make β more desirable. As explained in the next section,
randomization may hedge this uncertainty and thus the mixture might be strictly
preferable to either lottery.
DLR assume the Independence axiom only in their most restrictive model
(the EU additive representation). We focus also on their weakest Independence-
style axiom, called Indiﬀerence to Randomization (IR), which they adopt (either
explicitly or implicitly) in all of their representation theorems.1 We argue that
the case for IR is not clear-cut, at least given a particular conception of coarse
perceptions. Thus we are led to explore two alternative directions: one which
1DLR (p. 911) mention the case where ex post utilities are not vNM in the context of
establishing a result regarding minimality of the subjective state space. But such violations are
not described as germane to the issue of coarse contingencies.
3continues to assume IR and relaxes DLR’s Independence axiom, and a second
model which diﬀers more substantially from DLR - not only is IR dropped, but
the domain of preference is expanded to include random menus.2 In both cases,
we describe axioms for preference that arguably capture coarse perceptions and
that characterize functional forms for utility representing preference. The two
alternative axiomatic models of preference are the main results of the paper.
1.2. Utility Functions and Interpretations





where µ is a probability measure on ex post vNM utility functions u.( M o r ep r e c i s e
statements will be given below.) Given u, then choice out of x will maximize u(β),
but ex ante, the agent does not know which preference will prevail ex post. The
support of µ, corresponding to the set of ex post preferences that she views as
possible, constitutes her subjective state space. To evaluate x, she computes its
expected payoﬀ assuming an optimal choice of lottery in each subjective state.
Taken literally, the representation suggests that subjective states are foreseen by
the agent. They are distinguished rather by being uncontractable, that is, by
t h ef a c tt h a tw ec a n n o to b s e r v et h ea g e n t ’ sr a n k i n go fS a v a g e - s t y l ea c t so v e rt h e s e
states. Kreps [15] suggests that one can interpret the functional form alternatively
as an “as if” representation for an agent who does not foresee the states, and that
it is impossible to distinguish between these two interpretations by observing
only choice between menus. However, as sketched above, where menus consist of
lotteries then awareness that some states are unforeseen should lead to a preference
for randomization, contradicting Independence and hence also representation by
WDLR. Therefore, we interpret the DLR model as one where states are foreseen.
For ease of comparison, we describe informally also the two generalization of
WDLR axiomatized below. In the model where IR is satisﬁed, utility of a menu is
given by
W






where Π is a set of probability measures on the set of ex post vNM utility functions
u. (DLR is the special case where Π is a singleton.) As in the interpretation of
2Nehring [20, 21] also adopts the domain of random menus. For more on the connection
between our second model and Nehring’s work see Appendix C.2.
4WDLR, the agent observes the realization of some u and then chooses out of the









where µ is a probability measure over suitable sets U of vNM utilities.
Here what is foreseen is more a matter of interpretation. Regarding W,f o r
example, one could view each U as a foreseen coarse state, while the details (or
points u)w i t h i ne a c hU are unforeseen, but the agent is aware that each coarse
state U leaves unspeciﬁed some relevant details. In the special case where every U
is a singleton, this interpretation corresponds to the DLR model with every state
foreseen; more generally, the concavity of minu∈U u(β) as a function of β implies
the incentive to randomize that is intuitive given awareness of the coarseness of
U. However, a more literal interpretation of the functional form suggests that
even points within each U are foreseen. In that case, the minimization over U
suggests complete ignorance within U - the agent foresees and can describe the
details within U but has no idea how likely they are.3 From an ex ante perspective,
utility can be interpreted as reﬂecting the expectation of future ambiguity, due
to the realization of an ambiguous signal.4 Similarly, WMP has the multiple-
priors functional form axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler [10], where states
are foreseen but ambiguous (in the sense of the Ellsberg Paradox).
The reinterpretation in terms of ambiguity is not surprising given the role in
both of our models played by the hedging gains aﬀorded by randomization. As
argued by Gilboa and Schmeidler [10], such gains can ensue also if the agent is
averse to ambiguity. Indeed, we cannot distinguish the latter story - where the
agent foresees a complete set of states but is not sure of their likelihoods - from
the story upon which we focus, where the agent is aware of the coarseness of
her state space.5 Our axioms have intuitive interpretations in both cases, and
3Minimizing over U is equivalent to minimizing over all probability measures on U.
4If one overlooks the fact that the state space is exogenous only in [10], then our second
model can be viewed as a special case of recursive multiple-priors, a multi-period extension of
the Gilboa-Schmeidler model - see Epstein and Schneider [6].
5One apparently needs a richer framework to permit a distinction. It seems that “updating”
may be one way to distinguish between the two stories. The agent in our model is not thinking
explicitly in terms of the ﬁne details within a coarse contingency. But if someone tells him “this
speciﬁc detail exists”, that might change his perception and thus behavior. On the other hand,
s u c has t a t e m e n tw o u l dh a v en oe ﬀect on the ambiguity averse agent - he already foresees that
5consequently, the functional forms we derive can be interpreted in either way.
Thus one can view the paper in two diﬀerent lights. In one, it contributes to the
literature on preferences under ambiguity by deriving representations, including a
counterpart of multiple-priors utility, without relying on an exogenously speciﬁed
state space. The second perspective, and the one that we emphasize, is that
the paper shows that the very same models can also be interpreted as capturing
coarse contingencies. We emphasize this interpretation because the coarseness of
subjective contingencies seems to us to be potentially at least as important as
ambiguity, and arguably more basic - the nature of subjective states would seem
to be logically prior to the question of their likelihoods - and also because it has
not previously been shown how to model agents who are aware of the coarseness
of their conceptions.
We are not the ﬁrst to highlight the connection between coarse perceptions
and ambiguity. Mukerji [19] and Ghirardato [9] argue that an agent who is aware
that she has only a coarse perception of the state space can be thought of as
using a non-additive probability measure (or capacity). Their approach, inspired
by Dempster [5] and Shafer [24], is much diﬀerent than ours in that they take the
agent’s coarse perception as a primitive, while rendering it subjective is the heart
of our model. See Section 4.3 for further discussion.
T h ep a p e rp r o c e e d sa sf o l l o w s . N e x tw eo u t l i n et h eD L Rm o d e la n da r g u e
that their axioms preclude coarse contingencies. Then we describe two alternative
models to capture coarseness. Proofs are relegated to appendices.
2. THE DLR MODEL
The DLR model has the following primitives:
• B: ﬁnite set of actions - let | B |= B
• ∆(B): set of probability measures over B, endowed with the weak conver-
gence topology; generic lotteries are β,β
0, γ,...
•X: closed subsets of ∆(B), endowed with the Hausdorﬀ metric
g e n e r i ce l e m e n t sa r ed e n o t e dx,x0,y ,. . .and are called menus6
detail, and the statement does not give him new information about its likelihood.
6DLR do not restrict menus to be closed but this diﬀerence from their model is unimportant
and we overlook it throughout.
6• preference º is deﬁned on X
The agent ranks menus at time 0 (ex ante) using º with the understanding
that at time 1 (ex post), she will choose a lottery from the previously chosen menu
(see the time line). One can think of a menu as corresponding to an action to be













for further action ex post, that is, for the choice of β in ∆(B).T h e r e a r e n o
exogenous states of the world, but the agent may envisage some scenarios for time
1. She anticipates learning which scenario is realized before making her choice
out of the menu. Thus her subjective conceptualization of the future aﬀects her
expected choices out of menus and hence also her ex ante evaluation of menus.
In other words, her subjective state space underlies the preference º and (under
suitable assumptions) is revealed by it.




reveals that the agent conceives of a circumstance in which she would strictly
prefer β over β
0 and also another circumstance in which she would strictly prefer
β
0 over β. Under DLR’s set of axioms, subjective contingencies concern only the
possible ex post preference over lotteries. This is natural - payoﬀs rather than ex
post physical states per se are ultimately all that matter.
DLR assume throughout that preference satisﬁes the following two axioms:
ORDER: º is complete and transitive.
CONTINUITY: For every menu x, the sets {y ∈ X : y º x} and {y ∈ X : y ¹
x} are closed.
They occasionally, though not universally, adopt also the next axiom.
MONOTONICITY: For all menus x0 and x, x0 ⊃ x =⇒ x0 º x.
7The axiom states that ﬂexibility has non-negative value. For concreteness, we
restrict attention here to models satisfying this property.
The ﬁrst problematic axiom that we consider is Independence.7 It refers to
mixtures of two menus as deﬁned by
αx +( 1− α)y = {αβ +( 1− α)γ : β ∈ x, γ ∈ y}.
Formally, the indicated mixture of x and y is another menu and thus when the
agent contemplates that menu ex ante, she anticipates choosing out of
αx +( 1− α)y ex post. It follows that one should think of the randomization
corresponding to the α and (1 − α) weights as taking place at the end - after she
has chosen some mixed lottery αβ +( 1− α)γ out of the menu.
INDEPENDENCE:F o ra l lm e n u sx0,xand y and 0 <α<1,
x
0 º x ⇐⇒ αx
0 +( 1− α)y º αx +( 1− α)y.
In the introduction we asserted that the axiom is not intuitive for an agent who
is aware of the incompleteness of her subjective state space. Here we elaborate.
The typical rationale for Independence (DLR, p. 905, for example) relies on two
claims. First, is the intuitive appeal of the condition
x
0 º x =⇒ αx
0 ⊕ (1 − α)y º x ⊕ (1 − α)y, (2.1)
where αx ⊕ (1 − α)y denotes the lottery over menus that delivers x with prob-
ability α and y with probability (1 − α), and where the lottery is played out
immediately, that is, before any subjective uncertainty is resolved. The second
claim is that the agent should be indiﬀerent between the mixture αx +( 1− α)y
and the two-stage object αx ⊕ (1 − α)y. The diﬀerence between these two ‘mix-
tures’ is in the timing of the randomization (or coin toss). In the latter, the coin is
tossed immediately - a speciﬁc menu is realized before the agent sees a subjective
state and chooses from the menu. In contrast, in αx +( 1− α)y the randomiza-
tion is completed only at the end after choice out of the mixed menu. However,
we argue that this diﬀerence in timing matters when the agent is aware of the
incompleteness of her conceptualization, and that it is intuitive only that
αx +( 1− α)y º αx ⊕ (1 − α)y, (2.2)
7DLR use the term Independence to refer to a weaker condition than what is stated below.
However, the two axioms are equivalent given their continuity axiom.
8thus refuting the case for the invariance asserted in Independence.
That the timing of randomization matters can be understood as follows: an
agent who is aware of the coarseness of her conception of the future and averse to
it might behave as though she were playing a game against a malevolent nature.
She suspects that, after realization of a coarse contingency and after she has
chosen an action (or lottery) ex post, nature will complete the missing details
in a way that is unfavorable for her. Then, randomization that is completed
immediately, before nature acts, does nothing to impede persecution by nature.
However, when randomization is completed only after nature moves, then nature
is at a disadvantage. For example, if x = {β} and y = {γ},n a t u r em a yb ea b l e
to choose underlying details that lead to a low payoﬀ for β and other (diﬀerent)
d e t a i l st h a tl e a dt oa ne q u a l l yl o wp a y o ﬀ for γ, but then, in general, she cannot
be as eﬀective in sabotaging the mixture αβ +( 1− α)γ. The agent can expect
this to be true in particular if states in which β leads to a high (low) payoﬀ are
those in which γ has a low (high) payoﬀ,t h a ti s ,i fβ hedges γ. Though the agent
cannot describe these ﬁne states, it suﬃces that the preceding lies beneath her
coarse conception and is in the ‘back of her mind.’ Then late randomization will
be preferable, consistent with (2.2), and the latter can be understood as due to
the gain from hedging.8 The bottom line is that, because of hedging, the agent
might exhibit the ranking
{αβ +( 1− α)γ}Â{ β} ∼ {γ},
violating Independence.
DLR show that in conjunction with completeness, transitivity and suitable
continuity, Independence implies the following axiom:9
INDIFFERENCE TO RANDOMIZATION (IR): For every menu x,
x ∼ co(x).
8It is well-known in the theory of preference over lotteries, (see [17], for example), that the
timing of randomization matters for the normative appeal of Independence if the agent must
choose an auxiliary action before the risk is resolved. Independence is intuitive if the coin
toss corresponding to the randomization is completed before the action choice, but not if it is
completed only after the action must be chosen. The argument here about timing is similar
except that it is nature, rather than the agent, who takes the auxiliary action.
9co(x)={αβ +( 1− α)β
0 : β, β
0 ∈ x, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1} denotes the convex hull of x.A si nt h e
case of Independence, one should think of the randomization as occuring after choice is made
out of the menu.
9To evaluate this axiom, it is important to understand precisely the meaning
of the time line sketched above. It describes the agent’s ex ante expectations, for
example, that ex post she will be able to choose from the menu that is chosen
initially. The critical issue is what information she expects to have at that point.
In fact, it may very well be that the true complete (Savage-like) state will be
realized before she has to choose out of the menu. But since she does not conceive
of them ex ante, she cannot be thinking explicitly in terms of the complete states
that might be realized ex post. Rather, given her ex ante conceptualization in
terms of coarse contingencies, one natural assumption is that she expects only
to know which of these is true before choosing out of the menu. In that case,
she expects coarseness to persist even ex post. On the other hand, she need not
foresee all the complete states in order to believe that one of them will be realized
ex post.10 Thus an alternative assumption is that the agent anticipates that some
complete state will be realized ex post. The intuitive appeal of IR depends on
which of these assumptions is adopted.
If the agent anticipates that some complete state will be realized ex post, then
she can be certain that her ex post preference over lotteries will conform to vNM.
Thus she anticipates choosing out of the previously chosen menu x in order to
maximize a mixture linear utility over lotteries, which means that she will do as
well choosing out of x ex post as out of co(x). Being certain of this ex ante, she
will be indiﬀerent between x and co(x).T h i si st h ej u s t i ﬁcation for Indiﬀerence
to Randomization put forth by DLR.
Suppose, however, that coarseness is expected to persist ex post. Then the
agent expects to be concerned ex post not only with how any given lottery β
will play out, but also with how (payoﬀ-relevant) back-of-the-mind uncertainty
will be resolved eventually. Then, just as described above in the discussion of
Independence, randomization may be valuable ex post. Anticipating this ex ante,
she might strictly prefer co(x) to x, violating IR. Both hypotheses concerning the
agent’s expectations seem to us to be descriptively plausible. Thus we formulate
two alternative axiomatic models - one where IR is imposed and one where the
axioms reﬂect coarse perceptions that are expected to persist.
Finally, we describe the most restrictive utility functional form characterized
by DLR - the so-called non-negative additive EU representation. To express it,
note that each mixture linear u : ∆(B) −→ R1 can be identiﬁed with a (unique)
vector in N ⊂ RB, where the role of the subset N is to normalize vNM utilities
10Nevertheless, it seems to us that this assumption presumes a higher degree of awareness of
the underlying ﬁne states than does the alternative.
10so that each u corresponds to a unique ordering of lotteries. (DLR’s speciﬁcation
of N is not important here; later we adopt a diﬀerent speciﬁcation.) The utility




maxβ∈x u(β) dµ(u), (2.3)
where µ is a probability measure on N and u(β)=Σb∈B β (b)ub = u · β.
3. MODEL 1: SHORT-RUN COARSENESS
Here we consider an agent who has coarse contingencies in mind ex ante, but who
expects to see a complete state ex post before choosing out of a menu. As in DLR,
preference is deﬁn e do nt h es e tX of menus, and satisﬁes Order, Monotonicity,
and Indiﬀerence to Randomization. Other axioms are relaxed or modiﬁed as we
now describe.
First exclude total indiﬀerence.
NONDEGENERACY: x0 Â x for some menus x0 and x.
Our principal deviation from DLR is to relax Independence. From the argu-
ment surrounding (2.1)-(2.2) regarding the gains from hedging, we are led to the
following weakening of Independence:
PREFERENCE CONVEXITY: x0 º x =⇒ αx0 +( 1− α)x º x.
The intuition that ‘hedging’ motives may render randomization valuable recalls
the intuition provided in Gilboa and Schmeidler [10] for their relaxation of Inde-
pendence designed to accommodate ambiguity aversion. In their setting, there is
an exogenous set of complete states, objects of choice are acts over these states,
and hedging variation across states, which reduces ambiguity, is the rationale for
randomization. In the present setting, states or contingencies are subjective and
coarse, objects of choice are menus of actions rather than acts, and it is the hedg-
ing of variation across “missing details” that is the rationale for randomization.
But the basic intuition is similar.
Since Gilboa and Schmeidler [10] work in a diﬀerent setting, we verify that
Preference Convexity can be understood also as arising from the ambiguity aver-
sion of an agent who foresees a complete set of subjective states but who is not
sure about their likelihoods. Suppose the agent ex ante foresees each possible
11u, an ex post utility function over lotteries. Then she presumably anticipates
choosing out of any given menu conditionally on the realization of each u.F o r
example, given x, she anticipates choosing the lottery βu if u is realized. Thus
the menu x is equivalent for her to the (lottery-valued) act given by u 7−→ βu.
Similarly, x0 can be identiﬁed with an act u 7−→ β
0
u.T h e n x0 º x translates
into the weak preference for the primed act over the unprimed one. If states are
ambiguous for her, then, as argued by Gilboa and Schmeidler, she may strictly
prefer the α-mixture of these two acts to (βu). But the mixed act is feasible for
her by choosing conditionally on each u i fs h eh a st h em e n uαx0 +( 1− α)x,a n d
thus she can do at least as well with the latter menu as with x, which ‘proves’
Preference Convexity.
We adopt two additional axioms that are admittedly “excess baggage" - they
express ex ante certainty about the payoﬀst oas p e c i ﬁca l t e r n a t i v eb∗ in B and
certainty also that it will be the worst outcome (hence also lottery) ex post.
Fix b∗ in B.D e ﬁne a dominance relation on lotteries by: β ≥D β
0
if β (b∗) ≤ β
0 (b∗) and β (b) ≥ β
0 (b) for all b 6= b∗.
Thus β may be obtained from β
0 by shifting probability mass from b∗ to other
actions. Since she is certain that b∗ w i l lb ew o r s te xp o s t( a n dt h a te xp o s t
preference will conform to vNM), the agent can be certain that she will prefer β
to β
0 and hence that she would not choose β
0 (alone) if β is available; that is,
β
0 has no ﬂexibility value if β is feasible ex post. Extend this intuition by ﬁrst
extending the dominance relation to menus. Say that x dominates x0, written
x ≥D x0, if for every β
0 in x0 there exists β in x such that β ≥D β
0.I fx ≥D x0,
the agent can be certain of doing as well choosing out of x as out of x ∪ x0.T h i s
explains the next axiom.
WORST:F o ra l lm e n u sx0 and x,i fx ≥D x0,t h e nx ∼ x ∪ x0.
Given our other axioms, Worst implies that, for all menus x,
∆(B) ∼ B º x º{ b∗},a n dB Â{ b∗}.
By IR and Monotonicity, B ∼ ∆(B) º x. On the other hand, x ≥D {b∗} for any
x. Thus Worst and Monotonicity imply that x ∼ x∪{b∗}º{ b∗}. Conclude that
B º x º{ b∗}. (3.1)
12Finally, B ∼ {b∗} would imply total indiﬀerence, contrary to Nondegeneracy.
Though certain that b∗ will be worst and ∆(B) (or B) best, the agent may
nevertheless be uncertain about the cardinal payoﬀs to each; moreover, cardinal
payoﬀs are important when the agent evaluates menus ex ante and must weigh
payoﬀs across all possible contingencies. We assume that, in fact, expected car-
dinal payoﬀst ob o t hb∗ and ∆(B) are certain ex ante, where the payoﬀ to ∆(B)
refers to the payoﬀ to the lottery chosen out of ∆(B) ex post - the chosen lottery,
but not its payoﬀ, may vary with the (back-of-the-mind) state. If the cardinal
payoﬀst ob∗ and ∆(B) are certain, then so are the payoﬀs to all lotteries of the
form xp = p∆(B)+( 1− p)b∗,f o ra n yp in the unit interval.11 Therefore, mixing
with such lotteries provides no hedging gains, which suggests that the invariance
required by Independence should be satisﬁed for such mixtures. This explains:
CERTAINTY INDEPENDENCE:F o ra l lm e n u sx0 and x,a n dxp = p∆(B)+
(1 − p)b∗,a n df o ra l l0 <α<1,
x
0 º x ⇐⇒ αx
0 +( 1− α)xp º αx +( 1− α)xp.
Finally, we assume a mild form of continuity à la Herstein and Milnor [12].
MILD CONTINUITY: For all menus x,t h es e t s{p ∈ [0,1] : xp º x} and
{p ∈ [0,1] : xp ¹ x} are closed.
To describe the implied functional form, note that any vNM ex post preference
that is not degenerate and that ranks b∗ as worst can be identiﬁed with a unique












0 ⇐⇒ u · β ≥ u · β
0 for all u in N. (3.3)
Our ﬁrst model is summarized in:
11p∆(B)+( 1− p)b∗ = {pq +( 1− p)δb∗ : q ∈ ∆(B)}, a menu of lotteries.
12If there exists b0 6= b∗ such that β (b0) <β
0 (b0),t h e nu · β<u· β
0 for u deﬁned by ub0 =1
and ub =0 for b 6= b0.
13Theorem 3.1. Preference º on X satisﬁes Order, Monotonicity, Indiﬀerence
to Randomization, Nondegeneracy, Preference Convexity, Worst, Certainty In-
dependence and Mild Continuity, if and only if it admits a representation by
WMP : X → R of the form:
W





u(β) dπ (u), (3.4)
where Π is a convex and weak∗-compact set of Borel probability measures on N.
Moreover, there exists Π that is smallest (in the sense of set inclusion) amongst
sets satisfying the above. The set Π is a singleton (and so WMP has the DLR
form) if and only if, for all x,x0 ∈ X and all α ∈ [0,1],
x ∼ x
0 =⇒ αx +( 1− α)x
0 ¹ x. (3.5)
If preference satisﬁes Independence, then every menu satisﬁes (3.5), and the
theorem yields (a variant of) the DLR representation result for the non-negative
additive EU representation (2.3). We argued above that their model does not cap-
ture coarseness. More generally, on the surface the multiple-priors representation
does not seem to suggest coarse contingencies as much as ambiguity. However,
since we have shown that the underlying axioms, including Preference Convexity,
are well motivated by coarseness, it follows that the resulting functional form can
be understood as modeling coarseness.
An interpretation in terms of ambiguity is also warranted. We pointed out
earlier that the axioms, particularly Preference Convexity, are intuitive also for
an agent who foresees complete states whose likelihoods are ambiguous. Thus
the theorem can be viewed as extending Gilboa and Schmeidler’s [10] multiple-
priors utility model by dispensing with an exogenous state space. At a formal
level, Theorem 3.1 is not a trivial variation of the representation result in [10].
Our axioms deliver a (superlinear and translation invariant) preference functional
deﬁned only on the convex cone of support functions, a meagre subset of the set of
all continuous functions on N; in particular, the cone has an empty interior under
the supnorm topology. For this reason we have to use diﬀerent techniques than
the ones used in [10], and we exploit the notion of niveloid developed in [16]. The
smallness of the domain on which the preference functional is deﬁned results in
the non-uniqueness of the set Π of the representation (3.4), the domain not being
big enough to pin down a single set of priors, but only a smallest one.
144. MODEL 2: PERSISTENT COARSENESS
Section 2 argued that IR is not intuitive if ex ante coarseness is expected to
persist. Here we describe a second model designed to capture this conception of
coarseness. We deviate more drastically from DLR, beginning with the adoption
of an expanded domain for preference - we assume that the agent ranks not only
menus but all random menus. In this respect, and also in the nature of our central
axiom called Dominance, our approach is closer to that of Nehring [20, 21], as it
has been developed and generalized by Epstein and Seo [7].
The sets B, ∆(B) and X are as above.
Preference º is deﬁned on ∆(X).13 Generic elements of ∆(X) are denoted
P,P0,Q,... and are referred to as random menus. As indicated by the time line
below, for any random menu P chosen ex ante, a menu x is realized next, and













uncertainty resolved and ﬁnally to choose from the realized menu. A diﬀerence
from our ﬁrst model is that here, if she thinks in terms of coarse contingencies ex
ante, then she expects only to see one of those coarse contingencies ex post.
4.1. Utility
There is uncertainty ex ante about ex post preferences over lotteries. Ex post
payoﬀ functions are continuous functions v : ∆(B) → R satisfying suitable nor-
malizations. To express them, ﬁxt w oa c t i o n sb∗ and b∗,i d e n t i ﬁed with degener-
ate lotteries, interpreted as the worst and best lotteries ex post. This exacerbates
somewhat the problem of “excess baggage” in our ﬁrst model, since we now assume
that not only the worst, but also the best lottery is ﬁxed exogenously. Every vNM
13X is compact metric (and so Polish) under the Hausdorﬀ metric. It is endowed with the
Borel σ-algebra. Thus ∆(X) is the set of Borel probability measures. It is also compact Polish
under the weak-convergence topology. ∆(X) has similar meaning for any metric space X.
15ex post preference over lotteries that (is not total indiﬀerence and that) ranks b∗









H o w e v e r ,t h ea g e n td o e sn o tc o n c e i v eo fa l lo ft h e s ep o s s i b i l i t i e se xa n t e-r a t h e r
she thinks in terms of subsets of N∗.D e n o t eb yK(N∗) the set of closed subsets
of N∗, endowed with the Hausdorﬀ metric, which renders it compact metric. Say
that U ⊂ N∗ is comprehensive if U = {u0 ∈ N∗ : u0 ≥ u for some u ∈ U}.D e n o t e
by Kcc (N∗) the set of closed, convex and comprehensive subsets of N∗.( T h e n
Kcc (N∗) is also compact metric.)













for some Borel probability measure µ ∈ ∆(Kcc (N∗)).S a yt h a tµ represents the
corresponding preference.
To interpret, note ﬁrst that preference conforms to vNM theory when evalu-













u(β)dµ(U), x ∈ X. (4.2)
Since W represents the ranking of (nonrandom) menus, it can be compared with
DLR’s utility function (2.3), to which W reduces if µ has support on single-
tons.14 More generally, the functional form suggests the following interpretation:
the agent foresees coarse contingencies represented by sets U in the support of
µ. Since she does not think explicitly in terms of ﬁner contingencies, she antic-
ipates choosing out of the menu x conditionally on each of these possible coarse
contingencies. But she is aware ex ante that each set U leaves out some relevant
missing details. Further, she anticipates that she will continue to be aware of the
14More precisely, since µ is deﬁned only on comprehensive sets, DLR is the special case where
µ has support on sets of the form {u0 ∈ N∗ : u0 ≥ u} for some u in N∗.
16presence of missing details also given the realization of any particular U.T h i s
anticipation is captured by the fact that for any lottery β, its anticipated util-
ity conditional on U is given by minu∈U u(β). (In particular, the ex post utility
function over lotteries, given by β 7−→ minu∈U u(β), is not a vNM functional.)
Thus, given U, it is anticipated that a lottery will be chosen from x so as to solve
maxβ∈x minu∈U u(β). This leads to the evaluation of x shown in (4.2).
Note that the restriction to sets U t h a ta r ec o n v e xa n dc o m p r e h e n s i v ei sw l o g
- for any closed set U, minu∈U u(β) is unchanged if we replace U by its convex
hull, or if we add to U points u0 in N∗ such that u0 ≥ u for some u ∈ U.T h e
normalization to convex and comprehensive sets will permit us to show below that
the representing measure µ is unique.
As in our ﬁrst model, utility can be interpreted alternatively as modeling
ambiguity. The functional form (4.2) might describe an agent who conceives ex
ante of the complete states in N∗, but does not expect to see the true state
ex post. Rather, she expects only a “signal” U to be realized ex post. There
is no prior ambiguity about the likelihoods of signals; however, each signal is
“ambiguous” - it will inform the agent that the true state u lies in U,b u tl e a v eh e r
completely ignorant otherwise. This is a special case of recursive multiple-priors
utility studied by Epstein and Schneider [6] (though the information structure is
exogenous there and subjective here).
Finally, for perspective, consider the alternative functional form obtained by









u(β) dµ(U), x ∈ X. (4.3)
In general, Wrev is ordinally distinct from W. This is suggested by the fact that
the minimax theorem justifying such reversals of order requires that both sets x
and U be convex, but menus need not be convex. Preference represented by Wrev
satisﬁes all the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, including IR, and so it is a special
case of that model. (Appendix B describes a “concrete” set Π that provides the
multiple-priors representation.) However, preference represented by W violates
IR in general.
4.2. Axioms and Representation Result
Let º be a preference order on ∆(X).W ea s s u m et h a ti ti sc o m p l e t ea n dt r a n s i -
tive (Order), continuous in the usual sense (Continuity), and that it is not total
17indiﬀerence (Nondegeneracy).
We also assume that preference satisﬁes a form of independence. To distinguish
it from the Independence axiom in DLR, we give it another name.
FIRST-STAGE INDEPENDENCE: For all random menus P,P0 and Q and
for all 0 <α<1, P0 º P ⇐⇒ αP0 +( 1− α)Q º αP +( 1− α)Q.
Since a mixture such as αP +( 1− α)Q is a random menu, it follows from
t h et i m el i n ed e s c r i b e da b o v et h a tas p e c i ﬁcm e n ui sr e a l i z e db e f o r et h ea g e n t
sees a subjective state and chooses from the menu. In particular, therefore, all
randomization in both component measures P and Q, as well as in the mixing
is completed before then. As explained in our discussion of the DLR model, this
diﬀerence in timing diﬀerentiates First-Stage Independence from DLR’s Indepen-
dence, and there are no hedging gains from immediate randomization.15
Our key axiom is adapted from [20, 21] and [7]. Its statement makes use of
the fact that, by [1, Theorem 3.63], {x ∈ X : x ⊂ G} is open in X for every open
subset G ⊂ ∆(B). Therefore, for any menu y,
{x ∈ X : x ∩ y 6= ∅} = X\{x ∈ X : x ⊂ ∆(B)\y}
is closed, hence Borel measurable.
Let Y be a set of menus, each of which is interpreted as an upper contour set
f o rs o m ee xp o s tp r e f e r e n c eo r d e rt h a tt h ea g e n tv i e w sa sp o s s i b l e .W ea s s u m e :
DOMINANCE: If P 0 ({x ∈ X : x ∩ y 6= ∅}) ≥ P ({x ∈ X : x ∩ y 6= ∅})
for all menus y in Y ,t h e nP 0 º P.
Say that P0 dominates P if the condition in the axiom is satisﬁed.
Consider two implications of the axiom.16 First, when P0 = δx0 and P = δx
are degenerate, then δx0 dominates δx if x0 ⊃ x. Therefore, Dominance implies
Monotonicity:
x
0 ⊃ x =⇒ x
0 º x.
15First-Stage Independence corresponds to, and generalizes, condition (2.1). A diﬀerence is
that since only here is preference deﬁned on random menus, then only here is the axiom formally
meaningful.
16Nehring [20, 21] makes a similar observation for his setting.
18It also implies (given First-Stage Independence) Kreps’ second key axiom [14,




2δx0 and P = 1
2δx∩x0 + 1
2δx∪x0. (4.4)






Deduce from First-Stage Independence that
δx0 ∼ δx∩x0 =⇒ δx º δx∪x0.
Since Monotonicity is also implied, we have ﬁnally that (in the obvious notation)
x ∩ x
0 ∼ x
0 =⇒ x ∼ x ∪ x
0,
which is equivalent to Kreps’ axiom.17
To understand further the meaning of the axiom, think of each y in Y as an
upper contour set for some conceivable ex post preference. Thus lotteries in y are
“desirable” according to th a te xp o s tp r e f e r e n c ea n dx ∩ y 6= ∅ indicates that x
c o n t a i n sa tl e a s to n ed e s i r a b l ea c t i o n ,i nw h i c hc a s ew em i g h tr e f e rt ox as being
desirable. Accordingly, P0 dominates P if the probability of the realization of a
desirable menu is larger under P0, and if this is true for every set y and hence
for every conceivable deﬁnition of “desirable.” The set Y speciﬁes which upper
contour sets are relevant, or, in other words, Dominance for the given Y implies
certainty that ex post upper contour sets will lie in Y .
The content of the axiom depends on the speciﬁcation of Y which we now
describe. Fix actions b∗ and b∗,a n ds a yt h a tβ
0 is an elementary improvement of
β if either
β
0 − β = κδb∗ − κδb for some b 6= b
∗, or
β
0 − β = −κδb∗ + κδb for some b 6= b∗.
In the ﬁrst case, probability mass is shifted from some outcome b to b∗ and in
the second mass is shifted from b∗ to some other outcome. Both shifts are unam-
biguous improvements if b∗ and b∗ are the best and worst actions respectively. In
particular, if that is the case, then β
0 dominates β in the sense of the ﬁrst-order-
stochastic dominance relation induced by the ranking of actions.
Assume that Y consists of all nonempty sets y satisfying the following prop-
erties:18
17The latter is usually stated in the form x ∼ x0 ∪ x =⇒ x ∪ x00 ∼ x0 ∪ (x ∪ x00).
18βp denotes the lottery (b∗,p;b∗,1 − p).
19Y1 y is closed and convex
Y2 If β
0 is an elementary improvement of β,a n dβ ∈ y,t h e nβ
0 ∈ y
Y3 [β
0 6∈ y, βq 6∈ y for all q<p ]= ⇒ αβ
0 +( 1− α)βp 6∈ y for all α>0
To interpret these conditions in the context of Dominance, think again of Y
as consisting of ex post upper contour sets that the agent thinks possible ex ante.
For Y 1, y being closed reﬂects certainty that ex post preferences will be (upper
semi) continuous. Convexity expresses the certainty that randomization will be
(weakly) valuable. The expectation of indiﬀerence to randomization ex post would
be captured by adding the requirement that the complement yc (a strict lower
contour set) also be convex.19 The absence of this requirement permits a role for
randomization ex post.
Property Y 2 states that any elementary improvement of a lottery in an upper
contour set y is also in y. Thus it expresses certainty that b∗ and b∗ are the best
and worst actions respectively. An immediate implication is that
[βq ∈ y and p>q ]= ⇒ βp ∈ y. (4.5)
Iterating Y 2 yields that
b
∗ ∈ y for every y,
and b∗ ∈ y implies y = ∆(B).
Turn ﬁnally to Y 3.L e tβ
0 6∈ y, and suppose also that βp 6∈ y,w h i c h ,b y( 4 . 5 ) ,
is stronger than the stated hypothesis. We argued above that randomization can
be valuable to hedge coarseness. But suppose that, after realization of some coarse
contingency, the agent is certain not only that b∗ will be best ex post, but also
that its payoﬀ is constant across all back-of-the-mind details; and similarly for
b∗. Thus there is conditional certainty about the cardinal payoﬀst ob∗ and b∗,
from which it follows that there should be conditional certainty also about the
cardinal payoﬀst oa l lm i x t u r e sβp =( b∗,p;b∗,1 − p). But then mixing with βp (or
with any βq) should provide no hedging gains. In that case, the agent should not
expect αβ
0+(1− α)βp to be better than both component lotteries, each of which
is undesirable (in the sense of not lying in y). In other words, αβ
0+(1− α)βp 6∈ y.
19Suppose that yc is convex for every y in Y .T h e ny ∩ x = ∅ =⇒ x ⊂ yc =⇒
co(x) ⊂ yc =⇒ y ∩ co(x)=∅,a n dδx dominates δco(x). By Dominance, therefore, x º co(x).
Thus they must be indiﬀerent by Monotonicity.
20Finally, suppose that βp does indeed lie in y, but only barely in the sense that
βq 6∈ y for all q<p .S i n c e y is closed and β
0 6∈ y, it falls short by a discrete
amount from being desirable according to y.S i n c eβp is just barely in y, mixing
with βp is not enough to compensate for the deﬁciency in β
0.T h e r e f o r e ,a g a i nw e
conclude that αβ
0 +( 1− α)βp 6∈ y.
If the cardinal payoﬀst ob∗ and b∗ are expected to be certain conditional on
each coarse contingency, then not only should randomization with any βp be of no
value ex post, as just argued in connection with Y 3, but also ex ante there should
be no hedging gains. But hedging gains were the only reason for arguing that the
timing of randomization should matter and hence that indiﬀerence in (2.2) is not
intuitive. This explains the ﬁnal axiom:20
CERTAINTY REVERSAL OF ORDER: For every menu x0 ∈ X, 0 <α<1
and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
αx
0 ⊕ (1 − α){βp} ∼ αx
0 +( 1− α){βp}.
We can now state our second main result.
Theorem 4.1. º satisﬁes Order, Continuity, Nondegeneracy, First-Stage Inde-
pendence, Dominance and Certainty Reversal of Order if and only if it has a
representation of the form (4.1). Moreover, the representing measure µ in (4.1) is
unique.
Uniqueness of the representing measure may be surprising at ﬁrst - as DLR
point out for their model, state-dependence is inherent when the state space is
subjective, and it is well-known that state dependence complicates the identiﬁca-
tion of probabilities. The problem is avoided here because of the assumption that
payoﬀst ob∗ and b∗ are constant - this is enough state independence to identify
probabilities. Consequently, both t h es u b j e c t i v ec o a r s es t a t es p a c e( t h es u p p o r to f
µ) and ex ante beliefs about coarse contingencies are determined given preference
over random menus.
If Certainty Reversal of Order is strengthened so as to apply to all pairs of
menus, that is, to require indiﬀerence in (2.2) for all x0 and x,t h e nF i r s t - S t a g e
Independence implies Independence, and all subjective states are singletons (up
20In more accurate but less friendly notation, the axiom asserts that αδx0 +( 1− α)δ{βp} ∼
δαx0+(1−α){βp}.
21to being comprehensive) as in DLR - coarseness is excluded. Alternatively, the
latter model is obtained if Dominance is strengthened by shrinking Y so that, in
addition to Y 1−Y 3,e v e r yy in Y is required to have a convex complement (which
leads to indiﬀerence to randomization (IR)).
4.3. Dempster and Shafer-Style Models
Finally, we relate the model (4.2) to the Dempster-Shafer-style models of Mukerji
[19] and Ghirardato [9] mentioned in the introduction. They suppose that while
there exists a Savage-style state space S, the agent does not conceive of all the
complete states in S and has coarse perceptions. These are modeled through an
auxiliary epistemic state space Ω and a correspondence Γ from Ω into S.( S e et h e








U n l i k eaS a v a g ea g e n tw h ow o u l dv i e we a c hp h y s i c a la c t i o na sa na c tf r o mS
to the outcome set X, and who would evaluate it via its expected utility (using
a probability measure on S), the present agent views each action as a (possibly
multi-valued) act on Ω.
Ghirardato assumes that each b f is multi-valued where the nonsingleton nature
















In this formulation, both Ω and the acts b f are taken to be objective and hence
observable to the analyst. One can view our model (4.2) as one possible way to
render them subjective: take X = R1, Ω = Supp(µ) ⊂ Kcc (N∗),a n dp = µ,
where µ is the measure appearing in our representation; and identify each lottery
β in ∆(B) with the multi-valued act b β,








22Turn to the rest of the triangle (4.6). It is commutative if b f (ω)=f (Γ(ω)).
This is satisﬁed in our model if we take S = N∗ and Γ(U)=U ⊂ N∗.










where ν is the non-additive measure or capacity
ν (A)=µ({ω : Γ(ω) ⊂ A}),
and the integral on the right is in the sense of Choquet (see Schmeidler [23]).21
Since Schmeidler’s Choquet expected utility model was devised in order to ac-
commodate ambiguity, this demonstrates once again the close connection between
coarse perceptions and ambiguity.
Though there are diﬀerences in detail, similar remarks apply to Mukerji [19];
in particular, our model can be viewed as a way to endogenize the state spaces
Ω and S, as well as the correspondence Γ, all of which are taken as primitives by
Mukerji.
A. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1




u · β =m a x
β∈co(x)
u · β,f o r a n y x.
The proof of suﬃciency is quite long. We provide the complete argument here,
including preliminary results on niveloids that are formulated for a more abstract
setting and that extend some results of [16]. Proof of the minimality of the set Π
is based on a result of Ergin and Sarver [8].
A.1. Preliminaries
Begin with some preliminaries. Let C be a convex subset of some normed vector
space. A function h : C → R is quasiconvex if
h(tβ






21More precisely, it corresponds to the special case where ν is a belief function.
23It is quasiconcave if −f is quasiconvex, and it is quasimonotone if it is both
quasiconvex and quasiconcave.
The following result is due to [11, p. 1559].
Lemma A.1. Let h : C → R be continuous. Then h is quasimonotone if and
only if the sets {β : h(β)=c} are convex for all c ∈ R.









0 +( 1− t)β
00,y)=tT (β
0,y)+( 1− t)T (β
00,y), ∀y ∈ K. (A.2)
The function h : C → R deﬁned in (A.1) is easily seen to be concave.
Deﬁne
Θ(β)=a r gm i ny∈KT (β,y), ∀β ∈ C.
Say that h is aﬃne on some convex subset Q ⊆ C if h(λβ1 +( 1− λ)β2)=
λh(β1)+( 1− λ)h(β2) for all λ ∈ [0,1] and all β1,β2 ∈ Q.











for some collection {λi}i∈I with λi ∈ (0,1) and
P




(ii) Let Q ⊆ C be a convex set. Then h is aﬃne on Q iﬀ ∩β∈QΘ(β) 6= ∅.
(iii) Given c ∈ R,t h es e th−1 (c)={β ∈ C : h(β)=c} is convex only if
∩β∈h−1(c)Θ(β) 6= ∅.
Proof. In points (i) and (ii) we prove the “only if”, the converse being trivial.
(i) Let b y ∈ Θ(
Pn













λiT (βi,b yi). (A.4)
24On the other hand, b yi ∈ Θ(βi) implies:
T (βi,b yi) ≤ T (βi,b y), ∀i ∈ I.







w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e sT (βi,b y)=T (βi,b yi) for each i ∈ I. This shows that
Θ(
Pn
i=1 λiβi) ⊆∩ i∈IΘ(βi). The converse inclusion is trivial, and we conclude
that Θ(
Pn
i=1 λiβi)=∩i∈IΘ(βi) 6= ∅.
(ii) Suppose h is aﬃne on Q.A sQ is convex, this implies that h(
Pn
i=1 λiβi)= Pn
i=1 λih(βi) for any ﬁnite collection {βi}i∈I ⊆ Q,a n da n y{λi}i∈I with λi ∈ [0,1]
and
P
i∈I λi =1 . By the previous point, ∩i∈IΘ(βi) 6= ∅. As all sets Θ(β) are
compact, the Finite Intersection Property implies that ∩β∈QΘ(β) 6= ∅.
(iii) Let β1,β2 ∈ h−1 (c).A sh−1 (c) is convex,
h(λβ1 +( 1− λ)β2)=λh(β1)+( 1− λ)h(β2), ∀λ ∈ [0,1].
B yt h ep r e v i o u sp o i n t ,∩β∈h−1(c)Θ(β) 6= ∅. ¥
Lemma A.3. Let Q ⊆ C be a convex set and suppose h is continuous. Then h
is aﬃne on Q if and only if h is quasiconvex on Q and there exists γ ∈ Q such
that, for all λ ∈ [0,1] and all β ∈ Q,
h(β) ≥ h(γ) and h(λβ +( 1− λ)γ)=λh(β)+( 1− λ)h(γ).
In this case, there exists y ∈ K such that
h(β)=T (β,y), ∀β ∈ Q. (A.5)
Proof. For “only if”, take γ ∈ argminβ∈∆(B) h(β). Consider now the “if” part.
First observe that h is quasimonotone, and so by Lemma A.1 its level sets h−1 (c)=
{β : h(β)=c} are convex for all c ∈ R. By Lemma A.2(iii),
∩β∈h−1(c)Θ(β) 6= ∅, ∀c ∈ R.( A . 6 )
Set e Q = {β ∈ Q : h(β) >h(γ)}.L e tβ1,β2 ∈ e Q, and suppose h(β1) ≥ h(β2).I f
h(β1)=h(β2),t h e n
h(λβ1 +( 1− λ)β2)=λh(β1)+( 1− λ)h(β2), ∀λ ∈ [0,1]
25since h is quasimonotone. Suppose h(β1) >h(β2).T h e r ee x i s t sλ ∈ (0,1) such
that h(β2)=λh(β1)+( 1− λ)h(γ)=h(λβ1 +( 1− λ)γ).S e t c = h(β2).B y
(A.6), there is b y ∈ Θ(β2) ∩ Θ(λβ1 +( 1− λ)γ). Hence,
h(λβ1 +( 1− λ)γ)=T (λβ1 +( 1− λ)γ,b y)
≥ λT (β1,b y)+( 1− λ)T (γ,b y)
≥ λh(β1)+( 1− λ)h(γ)
= h(λβ1 +( 1− λ)γ),
so that T (β1,b y)=h(β1). Hence, b y ∈ Θ(β1), and we conclude that Θ(β1) ∩
Θ(β2) 6= ∅. By Lemma A.2(i), h(λβ1 +( 1− λ)β2)=λh(β1)+( 1− λ)h(β2) for
all λ ∈ [0,1], and so the function h is aﬃne on e Q.




= h(γ).I f β
∗ ∈ Q is also such that h(β
∗)=
h(γ),t h e nh
¡
tβ







since h is quasimonotone.
Suppose that β
∗ ∈ e Q.G i v e n λ ∈ [0,1], set βλ = λβ
















, ∀λ ∈ (0,1].

















∗ +( 1− t)β
¢
,
and so we can conclude that h is aﬃne on Q. By Lemma A.2(ii), ∩β∈QΘ(β) 6= ∅.
Any y ∈∩ β∈QΘ(β) satisﬁes (A.5). ¥
A.2. Niveloids
Let (E,≥,k·k) be a normed Riesz space and let H be aconvexcone inE containing
an order unit e.22 Say that k·k is an e-norm if there exists k>0 such that
|f| ≤ kkfke for all f ∈ E. Throughout we consider only e-norms.
22That is, E is a lattice under the order ≥ and the norm k·k is such that, for all f,g ∈ E,
kfk ≤ kgk whenever |f| ≤ |g|.R e c a l lt h a t|f| = f+ + f− = f ∨ 0+( −f) ∨ 0,a n dt h a te ∈ E+
is an order unit if for each f ∈ E there is α>0 such that |f| ≤ αe.
26Example A.4. Each normed Riesz space has a natural e-norm, called the e-
uniform Riesz norm, given by
kfke =i n f{k ≥ 0:|f| ≤ ke}.
In this case, |f| ≤ kfke e for all f ∈ E (see [3, p. 103]). For example, if E is a
function space and e is 1Ω,t h e nk·ke is the supnorm. N
Lemma A.5. If h1,h 2 ∈ H,t h e nh1 + h2 ∈ H.
A functional I : H → R with I (0) = 0 is an e-niveloid if it is monotone,
I (e)=1 ,a n d
I (h + αe)=I (h)+α for all h ∈ H and α ≥ 0.
I ft h ep r e c e d i n gi st r u ea l s of o ra l lα<0 such that h + αe ∈ H,s a yt h a tI is
e-translation invariant.
Lemma A.6. Any e-niveloid I : H → R is Lipschitz continuous and e-translation
invariant. Moreover, I is concave iﬀ it is quasiconcave.
Remark. Observe that Lemma A.6 applies to any e-niveloid on a convex cone.
Proof. For translation invariance, if α<0,t h e n
I (h)+α = I (h + αe − αe)+α = I (h + αe) − α + α = I (h + αe).
For the Lipschitz property, argue as follows: If f,g ∈ H,t h e nf −g ≤ |f − g|.
As k·k is an e-norm, we have |f − g| ≤ kkf − gke,a n ds of ≤ g + kkf − gke.
By the monotonicity of I,w eh a v eI (f) − I (g) ≤ kkf − gk.
Finally, suppose I is quasiconcave. Let f,g ∈ H with I (f) ≥ I (g) and set
α = I (f) − I (g).T h e nI is concave, because, for all t ∈ [0,1],
I (tf +( 1− t)g)+( 1− t)α = I (tf +( 1− t)(g + αe))
≥ tI (f)+( 1− t)I (g + αe)
= tI (f)+( 1− t)I (g)+( 1− t)α. ¥
Let (E,≥,k·k) be a Banach lattice with topological dual E∗.D e n o t e b y E∗
+





.R e c a l l
that a functional I : H → R is superlinear if it is positively homogeneous and
superadditive, i.e., I (f + g) ≤ I (f)+I (g) for all f,g ∈ H. Superlinearity and
concavity are equivalent properties for positively homogeneous functionals.
27Theorem A.7. Suppose E is a separable Banach lattice with E = H − H.L e t
I : H → R be a quasi-concave and positively homogeneous e-niveloid. Then there
exists a greatest superlinear e-niveloid b I : E → R that extends I,t h a ti s ,J ≤ b I
pointwise for any extension J : E → R of I. In particular, there exists a smallest
convex and weak∗-compact set Γ ⊆ ∆ such that
I (f)=m i n
L∈Γ
L(f), ∀f ∈ H.
The set Γ is a singleton iﬀ I is additive.
Proof. Deﬁne I0 : E → R by
I
0 (f)= s u p
g∈H,α∈R
{I (g)+α : g + αe ≤ f}.
Then I0 is a superlinear e-niveloid that extends I: It is readily veriﬁed that I0 = I
on H,a n dt h a tI0 is monotone and e-translation invariant. In addition:
• I0 is superadditive: suppose that f1,f 2 ∈ E and I0 (f1 + f2) <I 0 (f1)+I0 (f2).
Then there exist g1,g 2 ∈ H and α1,α 2 ∈ R,w i t hg1+α1e ≤ f1 and g2+α2e ≤
f2, such that
I
0 (f1 + f2) <I(g1)+α1 + I (g2)+α2 ≤ I (g1 + g2)+α1 + α2,
a contradiction, because g1 + g2 ∈ H and g1 + g2 +( α1 + α2)e ≤ f1 + f2.
• I0 is positively homogeneous: given any β ≥ 0 and f ∈ E,t h e n
I
0 (βf)= s u p
g∈H,α∈R









































{I (h)+γ : h + γe ≤ f} = βI
0 (f).
Let e I : E → R be any superlinear e-niveloid that extends I.T h es u p e r d i ﬀer-




∗ : e I (g) ≤ e I (f)+L(g − f) ∀g ∈ E
o
. (A.7)
28Since e I is concave and Lipschitz continuous (by Lemma A.6), ∂e I (f) is nonempty,
convex and weak∗-compact for each f ∈ E (see [22, Propn. 1.11]).
Show that e I (f)=m i n L∈∂h I(0) L(f):L e tL ∈ ∂e I (f).I fw et a k eg =0in (A.7),
we get e I (f) ≥ L(f), while if we take g =2 f,t h e nw eg e te I (f) ≤ L(f). Conclude
that e I (f)=L(f).T h i si m p l i e st h a t∂e I (f)=
n
L ∈ ∂e I (0) : L(f)=e I (f)
o
and
e I (f)=m i n L∈∂h I(0) L(f).
Next we show that ∂e I (0) ⊆ ∆.F i xf ∈ E and L ∈ ∂e I (0).T h e ne I (f + αe) ≤
L(f + αe) for all α ∈ R,a n ds oe I (f) ≤ L(f)+α
³
L(e) − e I (e)
´
for all α ∈ R.
This contradicts e I (f) > −∞ unless L(e)=e I (e)=1 .I t r e m a i n s t o p r o v e
that ∂e I (0) ⊆ E∗
+: L ∈ ∂e I (0) =⇒ L(f) ≥ e I (f) ≥ 0 for every f ∈ E+ by the
monotonicity of e I. Therefore ∂e I (0) ⊆ ∆.
Deﬁne I∗ : E∗ → R by I∗ (L)=i n f h∈H {L(h) − I (h)}.T h e n I∗ (L)=0for
L ∈ ∂e I (0). Therefore, for each f ∈ E,
e I (f)= m i n
L∈∂h I(0)




By [8, Propn. 2], there is a convex weak∗-compact set Γ such that23
I (h)=m i n
L∈Γ
{L(h) − I
∗ (L)}, ∀h ∈ H,
a n ds u c ht h a tΓ is smallest in this respect, that is, Γ ⊆ Φ for any convex weak∗-
compact set Φ satisfying
I (h)=m i n
L∈Φ
{L(h) − I
∗ (L)}, ∀h ∈ H.
Since
I (h)=e I (h)= m i n
L∈∂h I(0)
L(h)= m i n
L∈∂h I(0)
{L(h) − I
∗ (L)}, ∀h ∈ H,
it follows that Γ ⊆ ∂e I (0). Hence the functional b I : E → R given by
b I (f)=m i n
L∈Γ
L(f), ∀f ∈ E,
23Ergin and Sarver’s result shows the existence of a smallest weak∗-compact set. Its closed
convex hull is then the smallest convex and weak∗-compact set.
29is the greatest superlinear e-niveloid that extends I on E,t h a ti s ,b I ≥ e I for any
superlinear e-niveloid e I extending I.
As a result, Γ is the desired smallest set. In fact, let Γ0 ⊆ ∆ be any other
convex and weak∗-compact set such that I (f)=m i n L∈Γ0 L(f) for all f ∈ H.
Deﬁne e I : E → R by e I (f)=m i n L0∈Γ L(f). The functional e I is a superlinear
e-niveloid that extends I,a n ds ob I ≥ e I, which in turn implies Γ ⊆ Γ0.
Finally, suppose I is additive. By Lemma A.6, I is Lipschitz and so by the
Hahn-Banach Theorem it admits a unique linear extension J : E → R. Hence,
J ≤ b I,a n d
J (f)=−J (−f) ≥−b I (−f) ≥ b I (f) ≥ J (f), ∀f ∈ E,
which implies J = b I and Γ = {J}. ¥
Given a convex subset G containing both 0 and e,l e thGi be the vector sub-
space it generates.
Corollary A.8. Let G be a convex subset containing both 0 and e of a separable
Banach lattice E,w i t hE = hGi.L e tW : G → R be quasiconcave and monotone,
such that W (0) = 0 and
W (tf +( 1− t)γe)=tW (f)+( 1− t)γ, ∀f ∈ G,∀t,γ ∈ [0,1]. (A.8)
Then there exists a smallest convex and weak∗-compact set Γ ⊆ ∆ such that
W (f)=m i n
L∈Γ
L(f), ∀f ∈ G. (A.9)
The set Γ is a singleton iﬀ W is aﬃne.
Proof. Let H =
S
α>0 αG be the cone generated by G.F o r e a c h h ∈ H,t h e r e
exists α>0 such that h/α ∈ H.D e ﬁne I : H → R by I (h)=αW (h/α).
The functional I is well deﬁned: suppose that, for a given h ∈ H,t h e r ee x i s t




































as desired. Observe that h/β ∈ G and β ≤ α imply h/α ∈ G. Hence, given any
h1,h 2 ∈ H, there exists α ≥ 1such that hi/α ∈ Gand I (hi)=αW (hi/α) for
each i =1 ,2. This property will be tacitly used in the sequel.
30The functional I is clearly positively homogeneous and it is an e-niveloid. Show
that I is quasiconcave on H:g i v e na n yh1,h 2 ∈ H,t h e r ee x i s tα>0 such that
h1/α,h2/α ∈ G.F o ra n yt ∈ [0,1],







































=m i n{I (h1),I(h2)}.
Thus I is quasiconcave. By Theorem A.7, there is a smallest convex and weak∗-
compact set Γ ⊆ ∆ such that
I (f)=m i n
L∈Γ
L(f), ∀f ∈ H.
In particular, Γ is a singleton iﬀ I is additive. Hence, Γ is such that (A.9) holds,
and it is the smallest such set: suppose Γ0 ⊆ ∆ i sa n o t h e rs e tf o rw h i c h( A . 9 )
holds. Deﬁne e I : E → R by e I (f)=m i n L0∈Γ L(f).T h e ne I (f)=I (f) for all




L∈Γ0 L(f), ∀f ∈ E,
which implies Γ ⊆ Γ0.S i n c eI is additive iﬀ W is aﬃne, this completes the proof.
¥
A.3. Application
Let ∆(N) be the set of all Borel probability measures on N and C (N) be the set
of all continuous functions on N.E n d o wC (N) with the supnorm k·ks and deﬁne
an order ≥ on C (N) by f ≥ g if f (u) ≥ g(u) for all u ∈ N.
The triple (C (N),≥,k·ks) forms a separable Banach lattice; its dual is given
by the set of all bounded Borel measures and the set ∆ of Theorem A.7 is given
by ∆(N).M o r e o v e r ,1N is an order unit e that makes k·ks an e-norm, while the
0 is the function on N that is identically zero.
Denote by Σ the set of all support functions σx : N → R,g i v e nb yσx (u)=
maxβ∈x β · u for each u ∈ N and x ∈ X.T h e n Σ is a convex subset of C (N)
containing both e and 0. For the latter, note that σ∆(B) =1 N and σ{b∗} =0 .
For this setting we have the following version of a classic result of Hormander
[13].
31Lemma A.9. C (N) is the supnorm closure of hΣi.




α>0 αΣ. By proceeding as
in [13, p. 185], we can show that hΣi is a Riesz subspace of C (N).M o r e o v e r ,
given u,u0 ∈ N with u 6= u0 there is β ∈ ∆(N) such that β · u 6= β · u0. Hence,
σ{β} (u) 6= σ{β} (u0) and so hΣi separates the points of N.S i n c ehΣi also contains
1N, application of the lattice version of the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem completes
the proof. ¥
The next result is an immediate consequence of Corollary A.8 and Lemmas
A.3, A.6 and A.9. Observe that a weak∗-compact subset of ∆(N) is weakly
compact.
Corollary A.10. Let W : Σ → R be monotone, quasiconcave, satisfying W (0) =
0, W (e)=1 ,and
W (ασx +( 1− α)γe)=αW (σx)+( 1− α)γ, ∀σx ∈ Σ,∀α,γ ∈ [0,1].
There exists a smallest convex and weakly compact subset Π ⊆ ∆(N) such that




σx (u)dπ, ∀σx ∈ Σ.
The set Π is a singleton iﬀ W is quasimonotone.
Turn ﬁnally to the proof of Theorem 3.1. Adopt the hypotheses stated there.
Lemma A.11. There exists W : X → R that represents º and such that, for
each x,x0 ∈ X, α ∈ [0,1] and xp ∈ C,
W (αx +( 1− α)xp)=αW (x)+( 1− α)p, and
W (αx +( 1− α)x
0) ≥ min{W (x),W (x
0)}.
The functional W is unique up to positive aﬃne transformations.
Proof. The set C = {xp ≡ p∆(B)+( 1− p)b∗ : p ∈ [0,1]} is a convex subset of
the vector space {λ∆(B)+νb∗ : λ,ν ∈ R}.I n f a c t , f o r a l l xp,x q ∈ C and all
α ∈ [0,1] :
σαxp+(1−α)xq = ασxp +( 1− α)σxq = ασp∆(B)+(1−p)b∗ +( 1− α)σq∆(B)+(1−q)b∗
= α
¡




qσ∆(B) +( 1− q)σb∗
¢
=( αp +( 1− α)q)σ∆(B) +( 1− αp − (1 − α)q)σb∗
= σ(αp+(1−α)q)∆(B)+(1−αp−(1−α)q)b∗ = σxαp+(1−α)q
32and so αxp +( 1− α)xq = xαp+(1−α)q.
Because º satisﬁes the vNM axioms on C (for example, Mild Continuity
implies the Archimedean axiom on C), there exists an aﬃne function u : C → R,
unique up to positive aﬃne transformations, such that xp º xp0 iﬀ u(xp) ≥ u(xp0).
Normalize u so that u(b∗)=0and u(∆(B)) = 1. Hence,
u(xp)=u(p∆(B)+( 1− p)b∗)=pu(∆(B)) + (1 − p)u(b∗)=p.( A . 1 0 )
Any x ∈ X satisﬁes (3.1), that is, ∆(B) º x º b∗. B yM i l dC o n t i n u i t yt h e r e
exists a p ∈ [0,1] such that xp ∼ x. Such p is unique since, by (A.10), xp ∼ xq iﬀ
p = q.
Set W (x)=u(xp)=p. Clearly, x º x0 iﬀ W (x) ≥ W (x0),a n dW is the
unique functional on X representing º that reduces to u on C.
Consider x ∈ X and xp ∈ C.T h e r e e x i s t s xq ∈ C such that x ∼ xq.B y
Certainty Independence,
x ∼ xq ⇐⇒ αx +( 1− α)xp ∼ αxq +( 1− α)xp,
for all α ∈ [0,1],a n ds o
W (αx +( 1− α)xp)=W (αxq +( 1− α)xp)=αW (xq)+( 1− α)W (xp)
= αW (x)+( 1− α)W (xp).
Finally, quasiconcavity of W is a direct consequence of Preference Convexity. ¥
For any menu x,d e ﬁne its ≥D-hull by
hull(x)={β
0 ∈ ∆(B):β ≥D β
0 for some β ∈ x}.
If x is convex, then so is hull(x).
Lemma A.12. (i) For any convex x and β







(ii) For any convex x and y,
σy = σx =⇒ y ∼ x,
σy ≥ σx =⇒ y º x
33Proof. (i) Deﬁne ≥∗
D on RB by β ≥∗
D β
0 ⇐⇒ u · β ≥ u · β
0 for all u in N.B y
(3.3), ≥∗
D agrees with ≥D on ∆(B); hence we denote both orders by ≥D.L e t
H = {β ∈ R
B : Σbβb =1 }
and
hullH (x)={β
0 ∈ H : β ≥D β
0 for some β ∈ x}.
Then β
0 / ∈ hullH (x), a closed convex set. Therefore, there exists a v in RB such
that
supβ∈hullH(x) v · β<v· β
0.( A . 1 2 )
Since b∗ ∈ hullH (x), it follows that v · b∗ <v· β
0. T h i si m p l i e st h a tv is not a
constant.
Wlog let vb∗ =0 ,s ot h a tv · β
0 > 0. It remains only to show that
vb ≥ 0 for all b 6= b∗.( A . 1 3 )
In that case, we can renormalize v to obtain u ∈ N satisfying (A.11).
To prove (A.13), given any b 6= b∗ and κ<0,d e ﬁne
γk ≡ κδb +( 1− κ)δb∗.














Since this holds for every κ<0, vb ≥ 0.
(ii) We have
x ≥D hull(x) and y ≥D hull(y).
By Worst,
x ∼ hull(x) and y ∼ hull(y).( A . 1 4 )
Thus it suﬃces to show that
σx = σy =⇒ hull(x)=hull(y).
Suppose that β
0 ∈ hull(x)\hull(y). Then by (i) there exists u in N such that
σy (u) <β
0 · u ≤ σx (u),( A . 1 5 )
34a contradiction. Conclude that hull(x)=hull(y).
Finally, let σy ≥ σx on N. By (A.14), it is enough to show that hull(x) ⊆
hull(y). Otherwise, there exists β
0 ∈ hull(x)\hull(y), which implies (A.15),
contradicting our hypothesis. ¥
Deﬁne W : Σ → R by
W (σx)=W (x) for each x ∈ X. (A.16)
Then W is well-deﬁned because, by Lemmas A.11-A.12 and IR,
σx = σx0 =⇒ σco(x) = σco(x0) =⇒ co(x) ∼ co(x
0)= ⇒
W (co(x)) = W (co(x
0)) =⇒ W (x)=W (x
0).
Also by Lemma A.12, W is monotone, with W (0) = 0 and W (e)=1 .M o r e o v e r ,




= W (αx +( 1− α)xγ)
= αW (x)+( 1− α)W (xγ)
= αW (σx)+( 1− α)γW (σB), and




= W (αx +( 1− α)x
0)
≥ min{W (x),W (x
0)} =m i n{W (x),W(x
0)}.
Hence W satisﬁes the hypotheses of Corollary A.10, and so there exists a smallest
convex and weakly compact subset Π ⊆ ∆(N) such that, for each σ ∈ Σ,











Finally, if (3.5) holds, then Preference Convexity implies
x ∼ x
0 =⇒ αx +( 1− α)x
0 ∼ x, ∀x,x
0 ∈ X,∀α ∈ [0,1],
and so W is quasimonotone by Lemma A.1. By Corollary A.10, Π is a singleton.
35B. Appendix: A Set of Priors for Wrev
Let µ be a Borel probability measure on Kcc(N∗) with support Suppµ = U.S a y
that the collection {pU (·):U ∈ U} is a U-conditional probability system (U-cps)






pU (·) dµ(U) for some U-cps {pU (·)}
¾
.( B . 1 )
Each pU is a probability measure on U, which can be thought of as giving prob-
ability conditional on U. Measures in Π share the common ‘marginal’ µ on the
sets U, but all conditionals are admitted.


































Roughly, the structure (B.1) for Π permits the minimum over Π appearing outside
t h ei n t e g r a lt ob et a k e ni n s i d e .
C. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4.1
C.1. Upper Contour Sets
Refer to the menu y as an upper contour set if
y = {β ∈ ∆(B):m i n
u∈U
u · β ≥ s} (C.1)
for some 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 and some closed, convex and comprehensive U ⊂ N∗.
Proposition C.1. y is an upper contour set iﬀ it satisﬁes Y 1 − Y 3.M o r e o v e r ,




y ∈ X : y = {β ∈ ∆(B):m i n
u∈U






Since Kcc (N∗) is compact, it is straightforward to show that Y is compact (and
hence also measurable).24
Turn to the proof of the proposition.
Lemma C.2. Let y satisfy Y 1 − Y 3.I fβ
0 ∈ ∆(B)\y, then there exists u ∈ N∗
such that
u · β
0 <s≤ u · β for every β ∈ y, (C.3)
where
s =m i n {p ∈ [0,1] : βp ∈ y}. (C.4)
Proof. Deﬁne the partial order ≥D on ∆(B) as the smallest transitive relation
satisfying: β
0 ≥D β if β
0 is an elementary improvement of β.N o t e t h a t , f o r a l l
lotteries β,
b
∗ ≥D β ≥ b∗ for all β ∈ ∆(B),a n d ( C . 5 )
[β
0 ≥D β, β ∈ y]= ⇒ β
0 ∈ y. (C.6)
As a result, {p ∈ [0,1] : βp ∈ y} is nonempty because it contains β1 = b∗,a n d













0 +( 1− α)βs : α ∈ [0,1]}.
The deﬁnition of ≥D admits the obvious extension to all of RB.L e t
H = {β ∈ R
B : Σbβb =1 }
and
PhullH (y)={β ∈ H : β 6= βs,β≥D β
0 for some β
0 ∈ y}.
It follows from Y 1 that PhullH (y) is convex. Deﬁne also
D
0 = {β ∈ H : β







24I nL e m m aC . 4 ,w ep r o v et h ec o n t i n u i t yo fU × s 7−→ {β ∈ ∆(B):m i n u∈U u · β ≥ s}.
37This set is also closed and convex, and it does not intersect PhullH (y):i fβ ∈
D0 ∩ PhullH (y),t h e nt h e r ee x i s t sα>0 and β
0 in y such that
αβ
0 +( 1− α)βs ≥D β ≥D β
0.
Since ≥D is transitive, αβ
0+(1− α)βs ≥D β
0,a n dαβ
0+(1− α)βs ∈ y by (C.6).
But this contradicts (C.7).
Therefore, there exists a separating hyperplane v in RB such that
v · β
0 <v· βs ≤ v · β for all β ∈ PhullH (y),a n d ( C . 8 )
v · β ≤ v · βs for all β ∈ D
0.( C . 9 )




Claim 1. vb ≤ vb∗ for all b:L e tvb >v b∗ for some b, and consider β




b = −κ, β
0




∗,w h e r eκ>0.
Then for any lottery β, β
0 ≥D b∗ ≥D β. Hence β
0 ≥D β and β
0 ∈ PhullH (y).B u t
v · β
0 = vb∗ +( vb∗ − vb)κ<v· β
0 for suﬃciently large κ, contradicting (C.8).
Claim 2. vb∗ ≤ vb for all b:L e tvb <v b∗ for some b and consider β ∈ H of the
form
βb = −κ, βb∗ =1+κ,a n dβb0 =0for b
0 6= b,b∗,w h e r eκ>0.
Then, using (C.5), β
0 ≥D b∗ ≥D β, which implies β
0 ≥D β. Hence β ∈ D0.
However, v · β =( 1+κ)vb∗ − κvb >v· βs for suﬃciently large κ, contradicting
(C.9).
Finally, normalize v to obtain u in N∗ (ub∗ =0 ,u b∗ =1 ). Then u·βs = s and
(C.3) is satisﬁed. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n :W ep r o v eo n l ys u ﬃciency. Deﬁne s by (C.4), so that, by
(4.5),
βp ∈ y iﬀ p ≥ s.( C . 1 0 )
Let
U = {u ∈ N
∗ : u · β ≥ s ∀β ∈ y}.( C . 1 1 )
Then U is closed, convex and comprehensive. We claim that s and U satisfy (C.1).
38That y ⊂ {β ∈ ∆(B):m i n u∈U u · β ≥ s} is immediate from the deﬁnition of
U.T h u si tr e m a i n st op r o v et h a t
min
u∈U
u · β ≥ s =⇒ β ∈ y.




0 ≥ s and β
0 6∈ y. (C.12)
Then by the Lemma, there exists u ∈ N∗ such that
u · β
0 <s≤ u · β for every β ∈ y.( C . 1 3 )
Because s ≤ u · β for every β ∈ y, it follows that u ∈ U.B y( C . 1 2 ) ,u · β
0 ≥ s.
But this contradicts (C.13).
Turn to uniqueness. Suppose that
y = {β ∈ ∆(B):m i n
u∈U
u · β ≥ s} = {β ∈ ∆(B):m i n
u0∈U0 u
0 · β ≥ s
0},( C . 1 4 )
where U and s are as above and where U0 is closed, convex and comprehensive.
That s0 = s follows from (C.10). Evidently, U0 ⊂ U. To prove equality, let
u ∈ U\U0.S e p a r a t eu and U0 by some γ ∈ RB,
u · γ<u
0 · γ for all u
0 ∈ U
0.
Suppose that there exists γ ∈ ∆(B) satisfying the preceding (existence of such a
γ follows from a separation argument in RB and from comprehensiveness of U0).
Then, by mixing γ suitably with b∗ and b∗, it is wlog to assume that u · γ<
s<u 0 · γ for all u0 ∈ U0. But this is impossible: by (C.14), γ ∈ y (using the
U0-representation) and γ 6∈ y (using the U-representation). ¥
C.2. An Intermediate Result
In the suﬃciency part of the proof, we use some results from Epstein and Seo [7].
They prove a representation result for preferences over random menus satisfying
axioms that are collectively weaker than Order, Continuity, Nondegeneracy and
First-Stage Independence, plus a form of Dominance whose formal statement is
identical to the one in this paper, but where the set Y of upper contour sets is
required to satisfy a much weaker set of regularity conditions rather than Y 1−Y 3.
39(One qualiﬁcation is that Epstein and Seo permit B ∈ Y ,b u tt h i si sam a t t e ro f
a harmless diﬀerence in normalizations. Otherwise, their conditions are trivial
implications of (C.2).)
Therefore, deduce from [7] that º satisfying our axioms has a representation:
W (P)=
Z
m({y ∈ X : x ∩ y 6= ∅})dP (x) for all P ∈ ∆(X), (C.15)
for some countably additive probability measure m ∈ ∆(X),v i e w e da sam e a s u r e
over upper contour sets, such that m(Y )=1 . 25
The rationale for (C.15) can be understood roughly as follows: Order, Con-
tinuity and First-Stage Independence imply that there exists an expected utility




for some continuous vNM index W : X → [0,1]. The normalizations
W ({b∗})=0and W ({b
∗})=1 ,
can be shown to be wlog given the remaining axioms. It is well-known that, under
suitable assumptions, a set function, such as W, can be expressed in the form
W (x)=m({y ∈ X : x ∩ y 6= ∅}),f o ra l lx ∈ X,( C . 1 6 )
for some unique countably additive probability measure on the Borel σ-algebra
generated by the Hausdorﬀ topology on X (see [2, Theorems 50.1 and 51.1], as
well as the more recent works surveyed in [18]). The key property of W that









|I|+1 W (∪i∈Ixi).( C . 1 7 )
One way to understand the representation result (C.15) in [7] is that it shows that
the axioms for preference º adopted there imply that W is inﬁnitely alternating.26
25They prove also uniqueness of m, but we rely on [7] only for the existence of m.I no r d e r
to be as self-contained as possible, the uniqueness property that we need here is proven below -
see Lemma C.7.
26Nehring [20] was the ﬁrst to show a connection between an ordinal property analogous to
Dominance (that he calls Indirect Stochastic Dominance) and the cardinal property “inﬁnitely
alternating.” He derives a representation similar to (C.15) for his setting where menus consist
of alternatives from the ﬁnite set B rather than of lotteries over B.
40Finally, Dominance leads to the restriction m(Y )=1(thanks to a version
of (C.16) derived in [7]). This is because, as described in the text, Dominance
imposes ex ante certainty that only upper contour sets in Y will be relevant ex
post.
We use (C.15), including the restriction m(Y )=1 ,h e a v i l yb e l o ww h e r ew e
derive the further implications of Certainty Reversal of Order. We also use the
following lemma from [1, Theorem 14.69]:
Lemma C.3. The Borel σ-algebra on X coincides with the σ-algebra generated
b yt h es e t so ft h ef o r m
{y ∈ X : x ∩ y 6= ∅} for x ∈ X.
C.3. The Remainder of the Proof
Necessity: Only Dominance requires proof. The utility function W can be rewrit-
ten in the form (C.15). (Such a representation is implied not only by the axioms,
as noted above, but also by the functional form (4.1); the measure m is described
















P ({x : x ∩ y 6= ∅})dm(y),a n d
W (P




0 ({x : x ∩ y 6= ∅}) − P ({x : x ∩ y 6= ∅}))dm(y),
w h i c hi sn o n - n e g a t i v ei fP0 dominates P.
The remainder of the proof establishes suﬃciency of the axioms, and then the
asserted uniqueness.
We sometimes adopt the abbreviation
B = ∆(B).
Set
hU (β)=m i n
u∈U
uβ,( C . 1 8 )
41and deﬁne Ψ : Kcc (N∗) × [0,1] → Y by
Ψ(U,s)={β : hU (β) ≥ s}. (C.19)




By Proposition C.1, Ψ is one-to-one and onto.
Lemma C.4. For any Borel set D ⊂ Kcc (N∗), Ψ(D,[0,s]) is a Borel-measurable
subset of X.
Proof : First observe that
(β,U) 7−→ hU (β) is continuous. (C.20)
By the Maximum Theorem, it suﬃces to show that (i) (β,u) 7−→ uβ is jointly
continuous, and (ii) the correspondence Γ : B×K cc (N∗) Ã N∗ deﬁned by
Γ(β,U)=U,
is continuous. Condition (i) is clear. For (ii), when viewed as a function from
B×Kcc (N∗) into Kcc (N∗), Γ is continuous under the Hausdorﬀ metric. Therefore,
(ii) follows from [1, Theorem 14.16].
We claim that Ψ is continuous. By [1, Theorem 14.16], it suﬃces to show that
Ψ is a continuous correspondence.
To show that Ψ is upper hemicontinuous, let (Un,s n) → (U,s) and βn ∈
Ψ(Un,s n), and prove that βn has a limit point in Ψ(U,s).S i n c e B is compact,




≥ snk,f o r
every k,w h i c h ,b y( C . 2 0 ) ,i m p l i e st h a thU (β) ≥ s.
N o ws h o wt h a tΨ is lower hemicontinuous. Let (Un,s n) → (U,s) and β ∈
Ψ(U,s). We need to show that there is a sequence βn ∈ Ψ(Un,s n) such that








if hUn (β) < 1
1 if hUn (β)=1
and
βn = tnβ +( 1− tn)b
∗.
42If hUn (β) < 1,t h e n
hUn (βn)=tnhUn (β)+( 1− tn)
= −tn (1 − hUn (β)) + 1
≥−
1 − sn
1 − hUn (β)
(1 − hUn (β)) + 1 ≥ sn,
and if hUn (β)=1 ,t h e n
hUn (βn)=hUn (β)=1≥ sn.
Hence, βn ∈ Ψ(Un,s n).A n db y( C . 2 0 ) ,limn (1 − hUn (β)) ≤ limn (1 − sn) which
implies tn → 1 and βn → β.
Finally, ﬁx s ∈ [0,s] and let D be the set of measurable sets D such that
Ψ(D,[0,s]) is Borel measurable. Since Ψ is one-to-one, D is easily seen to be a
σ-algebra. Moreover, when D is closed, it is compact and hence, by continuity
of Ψ, Ψ(D,[0,s]) is also compact and hence measurable. Thus D contains every
closed set and thus also every Borel-measurable set. ¥
Lemma C.5. Let m ∈ ∆(X) be the probability measure satisfying (C.15). Then
Certainty Reversal of Order implies that, for each measurable D ⊂ Kcc (N∗),
m(Ψ(D,[0,s])) = s · m(Ψ(D,[0,1])).
Proof :R e c a l l t h a t m(Y )=1 . Therefore, by Proposition C.1, it suﬃces to
consider upper contour sets of the form y = {β : hU(β) ≥ s}. For any such set y
and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,d e ﬁne t ∗ y = {β : hU(β) ≥ ts}.F o rA ⊂ Y and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,l e t
t ∗ A = {t ∗ y : y ∈ A}.
Step 1.
t ∗ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ x 6= ∅} = {y ∈ Y : y ∩ (tx +( 1− t){b∗}) 6= ∅} :
When t =0 ,b o t hs e t sa r ee m p t y .L e t0 <t≤ 1.I ts u ﬃces to show that
y
0 ∈ Y and y
0 = t ∗ y,f o rs o m ey ∈ Y such that y ∩ x 6= ∅
⇐⇒ [y
0 ∈ Y and y
0 ∩ (tx +( 1− t){b∗}) 6= ∅].
=⇒: Assume that y0 = t∗y and y∩x 6= ∅.L e tˆ β ∈ y∩x and β













uˆ β ≥ ts.
43Hence β
0 ∈ y0.A l s o ,tˆ β +( 1− t)b∗ ∈ tx +( 1− t){b∗}.T h e r e f o r e ,
y0 ∩ (tx +( 1− t){b∗}) 6= ∅.
⇐=:L e ty0 ∈ Y and y0 ∩ (tx +( 1− t){b∗}) 6= ∅. By the latter condition, there
exists ˆ β ∈ x such that
β
0 = tˆ β +( 1− t)b∗ ∈ y
0.
Since y0 ∈ Y ,t h e r ee x i s tU ∈ Kcc (N∗) and s ∈ [0,1] such that y0 = {β : hU(β) ≥ s}.












uˆ β ≤ t.
Let y = {β : hU(β) ≥ s/t}.T h e n
t ∗ y =
½
β :m i n
u∈U




Moreover, ˆ β ∈ y because
tmin
u∈U










Hence b β ∈ x ∩ y 6= ∅. This completes the step.
Step 2. m(t ∗ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ x 6= ∅})=t · m({y ∈ Y : y ∩ x 6= ∅}) :
By Step 1, (C.15) and Certainty Reversal of Order,
m(t ∗ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ x 6= ∅})
= m({y ∈ Y : y ∩ (tx +( 1− t){b∗}) 6= ∅})
= m({y ∈ X : y ∩ (tx +( 1− t){b∗}) 6= ∅})
= W (tx +( 1− t){b∗})
= t · W (x)=t · m({y ∈ Y : y ∩ x 6= ∅}).
Step 3. For any Borel set A ⊂ Y ,w eh a v em(t ∗ A)=t · m(A) :
Let Σ be the collection of all Borel sets A ⊂ Y satisfying the noted condition.
It is easy to verify that Σ is a Dynkin system: (i) Y ∈ Σ; (ii) if A,A0 ∈ Σ and
A ⊂ A0,t h e nA0\A ∈ Σ; (iii) if a sequence {An} in Σ is such that An % A,t h e n
A ∈ Σ.T h ep r o o f sa r ea sf o l l o w s :
(i) m(t ∗ Y )=m(t ∗ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ B 6= ∅})=t · m({y ∈ Y : y ∩ B 6= ∅})=t ·
m(Y ),w h e r et h es e c o n de q u a l i t yi sb yS t e p2 .
44(ii) Since t ∗ (A0\A)=( t ∗ A0)\(t ∗ A) and t ∗ A ⊂ t ∗ A0,
m(t ∗ (A
0\A)) = m(t ∗ A
0) − m(t ∗ A)
= t · m(A
0) − t · m(A)=t · m(A
0\A).
(iii) m(t ∗ A)=l i mm(t ∗ An)=l i mt · m(An)=t · m(A).
Let F be the π-system generated by sets of the form {y ∈ Y : y ∩ x 6= ∅}.
That is, F is the smallest family of subsets such that F is closed under ﬁnite
intersections and {y ∈ Y : y ∩ x 6= ∅} ∈ F.
Show that F ⊂ Σ.L e tFn = {∩n
i=1 {y ∈ Y : y ∩ xi 6= ∅} : xi ∈ X}.I ts u ﬃces
to show that Fn ⊂ Σ for all n ≥ 1. Argue by induction. By Step 2, F1 ⊂ Σ.
Suppose Fn ⊂ Σ and show that Fn+1 ⊂ Σ.L e tAn = ∩n
i=1 {y ∈ Y : y ∩ xi 6= ∅}
and An+1 = An ∩ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ xn+1 6= ∅} ∈ Fn+1.T h e n
m(t ∗ An+1)=m(t ∗ An)+m(t{y ∈ Y : y ∩ xn+1 6= ∅})
−m[t ∗ (An ∪ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ xn+1 6= ∅})].
The last term can be rewritten as
m[t ∗ ([∩
n
i=1 {y ∈ Y : y ∩ xi 6= ∅}] ∪ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ xn+1 6= ∅})]
= m[t ∗ (∩
n
i=1 [{y ∈ Y : y ∩ xi 6= ∅} ∪ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ xn+1 6= ∅}])]
= m[t ∗ (∩
n
i=1 {y ∈ Y : y ∩ (xi ∪ xn+1) 6= ∅})]
= t · m[∩
n
i=1 {y ∈ Y : y ∩ (xi ∪ xn+1) 6= ∅}] (by Fn ⊂ Σ)
= t · m[(∩
n
i=1 {y ∈ Y : y ∩ xi 6= ∅}) ∪ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ xn+1 6= ∅}]
= t · m[An ∪ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ xn+1 6= ∅}].
Thus
m(t ∗ An+1)=t · m(An)+t · m({y ∈ Y : y ∩ xn+1 6= ∅})
−t · m[An ∪ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ xn+1 6= ∅}]=t · m(An+1).
Hence F ⊂ Σ.
Therefore, by Dynkin’s Lemma [1, Theorem 8.10], Σ includes the σ-algebra
generated by F,w h i c hi st h eB o r e lσ-algebra (Lemma C.3).
Finally, note that Ψ(D,[0,s]) = s ∗ Ψ(D,[0,1]) and Ψ(D,[0,1]) ⊂ Y .T h e r e -
fore, by Lemma C.4 and Step 3, m(Ψ(D,[0,s])) = s · m(Ψ(D,[0,1])). ¥
45The desired representation will be established using the measure µ ∈ ∆(Kcc (N∗))
deﬁned by
µ(D)=m(Ψ(D,[0,1])) for each Borel set D ⊂ K
cc (N
∗).( C . 2 1 )







uβdµ(U)dP (x) for each P ∈ ∆(K(B)).




hU (β) ≥ s
¾
= {y ∈ Y : y ∩ x 6= ∅}. (C.22)
⊂ : maxβ∈x hU (β) ≥ s =⇒∃ β ∈ x, hU (β) ≥ s =⇒ Ψ(U,s) ∈ {y ∈ Y : y ∩ x 6= ∅}.
⊃ :I fy ∈ Y and y ∩ x 6= ∅,t h e ny = Ψ(U,s) for some (U,s) ∈ Kcc (N∗) × [0,1],
and ∃β ∈ Ψ(U,s) ∩ x.T h e n hU (β) ≥ s.T h u s maxβ∈x hU (β) ≥ s and y =
Ψ(U,s) ∈ {Ψ(U0,s 0):m a x β∈x hU0 (β) ≥ s0}.
Since U 7→ maxβ∈x minu∈U u · β is bounded and continuous, it is µ-integrable.
Thus there is a decreasing sequence of step functions φn (U)=
Pn
i=1 αn,iIDn,i (U)






















m(Ψ(Dn,i,[0,α n,i])) (by Lemma C.5)
27Recall that hU and Ψ are deﬁned in (C.18) and (C.19).






(the sets Ψ(Dn,i,[0,α n,i])
are disjoint)







{Ψ(U,s):s ≤ φn (U)}
!
(since m is c.a.)
Since \
n















hU (β) ≥ s
¾¶







m({y ∈ Y : y ∩ x 6= ∅})dP (x)=W (P). ¥
It remains to prove the uniqueness assertion.
Lemma C.7. Given any µ ∈ ∆(Kcc (N∗)) such that preference º is represented







Then there exists a unique Borel probability measure mµ on X such that
W (x)=mµ ({y : x ∩ y 6= ∅}), ∀x ∈ X. (C.24)




µ({U : Ψ(U,s) ∈ B})dλ(s), (C.25)
where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure.
47Proof. The set function W is inﬁnitely alternating, that is, it satisﬁes (C.17).
Moreover, since µ is countably additive, the Monotone Convergence Theorem
implies that W (xn) ↓ W (x) whenever xn ↓ x. Thus the existence of a unique
measure mµ satisfying (C.24) follows from [2, Theorems 50.1, 51.1]. (In fact,
existence of mµ was asserted in Section C.2 and was used in Lemma C.5 - the new
claim here is uniqueness.)
For each s ∈ [0,1],d e ﬁne Ψs : Kcc (N∗) → Y by Ψs (U)=Ψ(U,s).A s a
correspondence, Ψs is compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous. By [1, Theorem
14.11], it is a closed correspondence. Hence, by [1, Theorem 14.68] it is measurable,
and so by [1, Corollary 14.70], when viewed as a function, Ψs is Borel measurable,
that is, Ψ−1
s (B)={U : Ψ(U,s) ∈ B} is Borel measurable for every measurable
B ⊂ X.
Therefore, s 7−→ µ ◦ Ψ−1
s (B) is well-deﬁned for each measurable B;i ti sa l s o









By the Monotone Convergence Theorem, m0
µ is easily seen to be a Borel measure.











{U :m a x
β∈x












s (e x)dλ = m
0
µ (e x),
where e x = {y ∈ Y : x ∩ y 6= ∅}.T h e r e f o r e , b y ( C . 2 4 ) , m0
µ (e x)=mµ (e x) for all
x ∈ X. By Lemma C.3 and the uniqueness property established in ﬁrst part of
t h ep r o o f ,w ec o n c l u d et h a tm0
µ (B)=mµ (B) for all measurable B. ¥
Lemma C.8. Suppose that µ and µ0 represent the same preference as in (4.1).
Then µ = µ0.
Proof :D e ﬁne W and W0 as in (C.23). Since both W and W0 are vNM indices
for expected utility functions representing º,t h e ym u s tb ei d e n t i c a l( g i v e na l s o
that they agree on {b∗} and {b∗}). Let mµ and mµ0 be the Borel probability
48measures on X corresponding to µ and µ0 as in Lemma C.7. Then by Lemma C.7,







µ({U : Ψ(U,s) ∈ Ψ(D,[0,1])})ds
= mµ (Ψ(D,[0,1])) = mµ0 (Ψ(D,[0,1])) = µ
0 (D). ¥
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